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ON THE COSTS OF UNIFORMITY AND THE PROSPECTS OF 
DUALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
DONALD A. DRIPPS* 
There are several reasons why I am both excited and honored to offer a 
comment on Professor Israel’s magisterial treatment of Free-Standing Due 
Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search for 
Interpretative Guidelines.1  In the first place, his meticulous and exhaustive 
review of the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence reflects the highest 
standards of legal scholarship.  Eighteen years ago Professor Israel published a 
painstaking analysis of how the Court had moved from a regime dominated by 
due process to a regime dominated by the Bill of Rights and how justices with 
different values managed to profoundly alter the governing law without 
questioning the incorporation decisions.2  Today he deals with the state of due 
process in a post-incorporation world, bringing equal care to a much longer 
and more complicated doctrinal story. 
In the second place, independent due process has received insufficient 
scholarly attention of late.  The Supreme Court’s decisions in Sacramento v. 
Lewis3 and Medina v. California4 have explicitly avowed what has long been 
implicit in the current criminal procedure regime based on the selective 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights; individuals challenging criminal 
proceedings solely on due process will be given a skeptical reception, if not 
short shrift.5  Criminal procedure doctrine is now virtually the reverse of the 
 
* James A. Levee Visiting Professor of Criminal Procedure, University of Minnesota Law 
School. 
 1. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001). 
 2. Jerold H. Israel, Foreword: Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 286 
(1982). 
 3. 523 U.S. 833, 854 (1998) (holding that high-speed chase by police did not violate 
substantive due process because high-speed chase did not shock the conscience). 
 4. 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (holding that state system requiring proof of competence by 
preponderance of the evidence did not violate due process, because state procedure did not 
conflict with the Bill of Rights, did not conflict with common-law tradition and was not 
fundamentally unfair in operation). 
 5. This is not to say that the Supreme Court has abandoned independent due process 
analysis.  In fact, a large number of quite vital Supreme Court precedents rest on independent due 
process in the criminal context.  See Israel, supra note 1, at 373-79.  Medina and Lewis are hard 
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regime that prevailed forty years ago, when in state cases due process stated 
the dominant norm and the Bill of Rights was, for the most part, inapplicable.  
Yet not since Sanford Kadish’s classic treatment6—a treatment that 
preceded the incorporation revolution, not to mention the administrative law 
due-process revolution in the entitlement cases—have we seen a 
thoroughgoing assessment of due process in criminal cases. 
Finally, Professor Jerold Israel was one of my law school teachers, one 
who inspired my interest in constitutional criminal procedure issues.  I am 
happy to report that many years later, I am still learning from him. 
SOME NONOBVIOUS COSTS OF UNIFORMITY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
I would like to focus on the most salient feature of the post-incorporation 
regime, which is the virtual uniformity of the constitutional standards 
applicable to state and federal criminal procedure.7  The view that Fourteenth 
Amendment due process incidentally includes some features in the Bill of 
Rights, but nonetheless provided not just an independent, but exclusive, source 
of constitutional law in state cases, is a dinosaur.  But even if due process were 
given a more robust reading, the textual identity of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clauses means that the current regime will enforce a 
uniform set of constitutional standards in state and federal cases.  Independent 
due process, however understood, cannot free the states to depart from federal 
standards.  Much good has come from the merger of state and federal 
standards, but I would like to dwell briefly on some of the costs that have 
attended incorporation. 
The first of these has been noted for a long time.  The old libertarian 
interpretations of the Bill of Rights have, as Justice Harlan foresaw,8 been 
diluted so as to avoid imposing on the states intolerable obstacles to the 
 
to maintain given the number of the independent due process cases.  Indeed, in Cooper v. 
Oklahoma, a unanimous Court relied on instrumental as well as historical factors in holding that it 
violates due process to assign to the defendant the burden of proving competence by clear and 
convincing evidence.  517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996).  What Lewis and Medina may mean is that due 
process attacks on traditional procedures, or in favor of new unenumerated substantive rights, 
face an uphill climb, especially when these due process claims are motivated by the rejection of 
factually similar claims brought under the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amendments. 
 6. Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication—A Survey 
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957). 
 7. See, e.g., Joseph H. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 
SUP. CT. REV. 65, 67 (“Since the Revolution, the only criminal procedure law that matters on 
most issues–from the point of view of both state and federal courts–is federal criminal procedure 
law.  Federal criminal procedure law has become in effect a detailed, national Code of Criminal 
Procedure that almost totally supersedes state law.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 117, 130 (“‘[I]ncorporation’ would neutralize the 
potency of guarantees in federal courts in order to accommodate the diversity of our federal 
system.”) (Harlan, J., separate opinion). 
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enforcement of garden-variety felonies.  Nonetheless, the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the confrontation clause and the double jeopardy bar have 
made it more difficult to convict the guilty in state courts.  In short, national 
uniformity forced the Court to choose between efficient law enforcement in 
state cases and vigorous protection of individual liberty in federal cases. 
The Court has done some of both.  It has become easier—some would say 
too easy—to prosecute the political offenses that are properly federal.  And it 
has become harder—some would say too hard—to prosecute the forcible 
felonies that are properly within the jurisdiction of the states. 
I do not look with comfort on the ability of federal prosecutors to subpoena 
or seize under warrants the personal diaries of prominent public officials.9  Nor 
can I express much enthusiasm for holding that an invocation of the Miranda 
right to counsel requires suppressing a subsequent statement made after the 
passage of more than twenty-four hours, during which the suspected killer met 
with counsel, and after the suspect was again advised of his rights before 
speaking.10 
Admittedly, Miranda has imposed only minor costs on law enforcement.11  
This proposition, however, does not do much for the case of state/federal 
 
 9. See Senate Select Committee on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 21 (1994) 
(enforcing subpoena for personal diary of U.S. Senator). 
 10. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990). 
 11. Experience has shown that Miranda does far less harm to law enforcement than the 
Miranda dissenters feared.  Justice Harlan thought that Miranda would “heavily handicap 
questioning.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justice 
White thought interrogation less coercive, and suspects more cunning, than appears to be the case, 
for he thought that the majority “not only prevents the use of compelled confessions but for all 
practical purposes forbids interrogation except in the presence of counsel.”  Id. at 536 (White, J., 
dissenting).  Current research, however, indicates that eighty percent of suspects waive rather 
than invoke Miranda rights.  See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 859 (1996); Richard 
A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286 (1996).  The 
eighty percent figure does not include non-custodial interviews in which the police need not 
administer the warnings, and the suspects who invoke their Miranda rights would be the suspects 
least likely to confess under questioning that complies with the due process test.  Experience thus 
seems to have lessened the strength of the Miranda dissents.  See Brief for the Respondent at 32, 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (No. 99-5525) (“In our view, however, the cost of 
Miranda’s exclusionary rule does not so impede or undermine law enforcement that the 
overruling of Miranda is warranted.  Rather, the judgment and experience of federal law 
enforcement agencies is that Miranda is workable in practice and serves several significant law 
enforcement objectives.”). 
  There is extensive and contentious empirical research literature on Miranda’s 
consequences.  See id. at 32 n.23 (citing studies).  Even Paul G. Cassell, however, estimates 
Miranda’s social cost as the loss of convictions in 3.8% of all arrests.  See Paul G. Cassell & 
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?  A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects 
on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1061 (1998).  This estimate is based on the 
assumptions that Miranda caused a sixteen percent drop in the number of cases in which the 
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uniformity.  Miranda does only minor harm to law enforcement because 
Miranda provides only modest protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege.12  
Incorporation has meant that the courts must choose between vigorous 
readings of the Bill of Rights and greatly impairing the enforcement of state 
criminal law.  The belief that this choice was exercised in favor of the Bill of 
Rights by the Warren Court and in favor of law enforcement during the tenures 
of Chief Justices Burger and Rehnquist is not quite correct.  As Miranda 
illustrates (and one could cite Hoffa v. United States,13 Alderman v. United 
States,14 Warden v. Hayden,15 Terry v. Ohio16 and Schmerber v. California17 as 
well) the Warren Court itself began rolling back long-standing interpretations 
of the Bill of Rights as soon as the ink of the incorporation decisions had dried 
in the pages of the United States Reports.  Judicial ideology matters, but the 
pressure of policy considerations has an independent force. 
Three other costs are less widely perceived but at least as real.  Thoughtful 
observers from various ideological quarters have condemned the creeping 
federalization of the substantive criminal law, a process that expands federal 
power, burdens the federal courts and displaces a traditional state 
responsibility.18  The Court’s recent attempts to resurrect some limits on the 
federal commerce power have little chance of success; at least it seems highly 
 
suspect confesses, and that a confession is necessary to obtain a conviction in twenty-four percent 
of these cases.  This in turn assumes, among other things, that (1) all persons who refuse to make 
an incriminating statement because of Miranda are, in fact, guilty; (2) that Miranda causes the 
loss of confessions randomly, i.e., that the police do not work more successfully to obtain waivers 
and statements in cases in which these appear to be necessary, or to work harder to obtain 
evidence other than a confession when it is known that the suspect has invoked; (3) that the 
confession rate can be estimated consistently by different researchers at different times; and (4) 
that the police and suspects would return to 1965 behavior patterns if Miranda were overruled.  In 
my view each of these assumptions is false, but the 3.8% estimate, inflated as it is, is not the sort 
of cataclysm that Miranda’s contemporary critics feared. 
 12. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 680 
(1992). 
 13. 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) (finding that Fourth Amendment does not apply to insinuation 
of informant into suspect’s inner circle). 
 14. 394 U.S. 165, 189 (1969) (reaffirming Fourth Amendment standing doctrine). 
 15. 387 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1967) (abrogating mere evidence rule, thereby permitting police 
to seize evidence other than fruits, instrumentalities or contraband). 
 16. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (upholding police power to detain for investigation absent warrant 
or probable cause, given specific facts warranting reasonable person to believe crime is about to 
be committed). 
 17. 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding that Fifth Amendment does not prohibit compelled 
surrender of nontestimonial evidence). 
 18. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, America and the Courts: The 1998 Year-End Report of 
the Federal Judiciary 2 (May/June 1999), available at http://www.november.org/1222.html; 
James Strazella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE REP. 1998, at 
24-43; Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (1996). 
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unlikely that the justices can cabin the federal criminal jurisdiction without 
throwing out the welfare-regulatory state we have lived under since the 1930s.  
So long as crime is feared by voters, and so long as federal officials have the 
money, political incentives will carry the Congress further and further in the 
direction of making car-jacking and rape federal offenses.19  What might stem 
the tide is a genuine state advantage in criminal procedure, so that from the 
standpoint of crime control there would be a reason to rely on the states, rather 
than the federal government, for the prosecution of ordinary felonies. 
I do not claim that incorporation caused the growth in federal criminal law 
enforcement.  To cite but one counter-example, the federal government played 
a major role in the narcotics field even when many state courts gave local 
police the great advantage of admitting illegally-seized evidence.  Narcotics 
prohibition, however, is a genuinely federal problem, at least so long as a 
significant portion of the prohibited drugs in the domestic market originates 
abroad.  The trend to federalization, however, has gone far beyond federal 
enforcement of crimes with a foreign-commerce connection. 
Prior to the revolution in constitutional interpretation during the New Deal, 
there was general agreement that the federal government lacked jurisdiction to 
prosecute the common-law felonies except as they arose on federal territory.  
Freed by the 1937 sea change to exercise the functional equivalent of a federal 
police power, it was only a matter of time before Congress turned to doing 
something about crime.  The occasion arrived in the 1960s, when rising crime 
rates, riots and assassinations propelled the crime issue into presidential 
politics.  The demand that federal officials do something about crime, recurring 
every election cycle, has brought us to the present state of affairs. 
Without the Supreme Court’s incorporation decisions these pressures 
would still have operated.  They would, however, sooner or later have run into 
the genuine efficiency advantage the states would have retained under a dual 
system of criminal procedure.  Suppose, for instance, that the Warren Court in 
the Alderman case20 had recognized target standing to invoke the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule but only in federal cases.  Suppose further that 
in Griffin v. California,21 the Court had permitted comment on the defendant’s 
failure to testify but only in state cases.  To take one more illustration from the 
Warren period, what if the Court had held that the Sixth Amendment right to 
 
 19. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 
72 TEMP. L. REV. 673, 674-75 (1999) (“Despite Lopez, the federalization of crime has 
accelerated.  Congress simply amended the statute at issue in Lopez and continued to federalize 
crimes that once were the exclusive domain of the states.  Between 1996 and 1998 alone, the 
105th Congress passed numerous criminal statutes, adding more than a dozen criminal statutory 
sections to the United States Code.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 20. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
 21. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that judicial comment on the defendant’s failure to 
testify violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). 
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counsel applies to pretrial identification procedures (whether pre- or post-
indictment, whether corporeal or photographic),22 but that due process 
permitted the states to proceed with fair procedures absent defense counsel. 
What if, more recently, the Court had limited the requirement of physical 
“confrontation” under the Sixth Amendment, and permitted the states to 
employ televised testimony so long as the accused enjoyed full cross-
examination?23  If Michigan v. Mosley24 governed the consequences of 
invoking counsel as well as silence in state, but not federal, Miranda cases?  If 
state, but not federal, officers could claim the benefit of the good-faith 
exception set forth in United States v. Leon25? 
I am not endorsing every one of these possible dualities.  They indicate, 
however, that the political pressures to federalize crime could be 
counterbalanced by state procedural advantages.  Why federalize the 
prosecution of sexual assault, if the states enjoyed an advantage regarding 
confrontation?  Why federalize drug prosecutions, if the states worked under a 
more circumscribed exclusionary rule than the federal authorities? 
A third cost is that the expense and risks of a trial that complies fully with 
the eighteenth century standards set out in the Bill of Rights have meant that 
almost nobody gets a trial.  Rather than hazard a time-consuming trial, at 
which the dereliction of the witnesses or some fluke reaction among the jurors 
might defeat a meritorious charge, with no chance of retrial, prosecutors are 
inclined to seek guilty pleas rather than go to trial.  The more draconian 
penalties authorized by elected legislatures are rarely imposed, but serve as the 
basis for coercive offers by prosecutors who cannot afford the kind of trial 
envisioned by the Bill of Rights.26  It is not unusual for a serious crime to be 
 
 22. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967) (holding that right to counsel 
attaches to pretrial, post-indictment lineup because lineup is critical stage of criminal process). 
 23. Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 805, 857 (1990) (holding that confrontation clause 
permits closed-circuit televised testimony only given case-specific finding that in-court testimony 
would traumatize child witness). 
 24. 423 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1975) (holding that police may obtain valid waiver subsequent to 
suspect’s invocation of right to silence).  Under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981), 
and its progeny, the invocation of the right to counsel, as distinct from the right to silence, raises a 
bar to future questioning in the absence of some affirmative initiation by the suspect. 
 25. 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (holding that exclusionary rule does not require suppression of 
evidence obtained by police acting in objectively reasonable reliance on warrant erroneously 
issued by judge). 
 26. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1965 (1992) (“[W]here the legislature drafts broad criminal statutes and then attaches 
mandatory sentences to those statutes, prosecutors have an unchecked opportunity to overcharge 
and generate easy pleas, a form of strategic behavior that exacerbates the structural deficiencies 
endemic to plea bargaining.”).  The prosecutor’s ability to make the defendant “an offer he can’t 
refuse” is, however, not limited to broad statutes with mandatory minimum sentences.  So long as 
typical criminal transactions can be charged out in various ways with substantial disparities in the 
corresponding penalties, the prosecutor can impose a heavy sanction on the defendant’s decision 
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bargained down to a suspended sentence of one sort or another, with the 
defendant later committed to prison after an administrative law type hearing 
for violating the various and intrusive conditions of probation or parole.  We 
have invited, if not virtually forced, legislatures and law enforcement officials 
to exploit the constitutionally unregulated substantive criminal law as a threat 
to those who refuse to waive the constitutional right to a trial society has 
concluded it cannot afford.  One can describe this arrangement in many ways, 
but trial by jury is not one of them. 
A previous qualification is in order here as well.  Incorporation did not 
cause plea bargaining any more than incorporation caused the trend toward 
federalization.27  But if the Supreme Court had worked at identifying the most 
rigorous trial system society could be expected to pay for at any given point in 
our history, and insisted on that minimum and nothing more, alternatives to 
plea bargains might have become far more attractive.  The inquiry might be 
expressed in a different way; what procedural safeguards should the accused be 
permitted to insist upon without running the risk of a more onerous sentence?  
At the moment, the answer to that question is the advice of an overworked, 
underpaid public defender followed by a brief plea colloquy in court. 
So phrased the test has another edge to it, i.e., the judges would feel much 
better about prohibiting the prevailing practice of punishing the exercise of 
constitutional rights if the constitutional rights were such that every innocent 
defendant would want them and every state could afford them.  Constitutional 
doctrine might regulate the legislature’s authorization of draconian minimum 
sentences under the Eighth Amendment, or prohibit functionally coercive 
offers under the due process clause.  That has not happened, at least in part 
because of the perceived cost of providing trial by jury to every defendant. 
Finally, a regime dominated by the Bill of Rights is likely to give 
insufficient regard not just to due process, but to equal protection.  The 
disparate impact of investigation and prosecution on African-Americans poses 
a disturbing challenge to our system of justice.28  The natural doctrinal 
response lies in the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Bill of Rights.  
Incorporation does not logically preclude a vigorous role for the equal 
protection clause in criminal cases.  The preoccupation with the Bill of Rights, 
however, has deflected attention from the very real problem of discretionary 
decisions with racially disproportionate effects. 
 
to stand trial.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 
1991-93 (1992). 
 27. George Fisher, in an impressive recent study, dates the dominance of plea bargaining, 
roughly speaking, to the final decades of the nineteenth century.  See George Fisher, Plea 
Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000). 
 28. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, 
AND THE LAW (1997); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT 
IN AMERICA (1995). 
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In spite of this long list of liabilities, the current regime makes sense from 
a historical standpoint.  The strongest reason the Warren Court had for turning 
to the Bill of Rights (and that the Court still has for continuing to concentrate 
on the Bill of Rights) is that the approach the Court took to independent due 
process analysis in the years before the incorporation decisions was 
unsuccessful.  The two key rulings were Hurtado v. California, 29 which 
equated due process with “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which 
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,” and Betts v. Brady,30 
which required courts to assess fundamental fairness on a case-by-case basis 
taking account of the totality of the circumstances. 
Prominent scholars31 of late have noted the congruity of Boyd v. Unites 
States32 and Lochner v. New York,33 but Lochner shares at least as much with 
Hurtado as with Boyd.  The insistence that fundamentally unjust legislation is 
not law, and the trust in the courts to identify departures from fundamental 
principles, is essential to the reasoning in both decisions.  Lochner is dead; 
Boyd is dead; but Hurtado is still with us.  Witness the Medina Court’s 
continued use of the substantive due process standard to test procedural 
fairness, reflected in the Medina opinion’s treatment of “‘fundamental 
fairness’ in operation.”34  Witness also the Lewis Court’s insistence that 
anything that shocks the conscience must be unconstitutional, but that nothing 
short of that violates substantive due process in the administration of criminal 
justice. 
Coupled with Betts, the fundamental fairness test gave the Court sweeping 
power to reverse convictions it found offensive, but virtually no power to 
regulate the behavior of police and lower courts.  One case could supply no 
guidance about another, and the Supreme Court never heard enough criminal 
cases (and never could have heard enough of the them) to give content to the 
standard by illustrative examples.  Minute changes in the facts lead to different 
outcomes.  Little wonder that realists like Warren and Douglas could agree 
with a formalist like Black to turn to the rule-like text of the Bill of Rights as a 
way to reform the criminal process without resort to unenumerated rights. 
 
 29. 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884). 
 30. 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). 
 31. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
393, 419-433 (1995); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, 
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 573-81 (1995). 
 32. 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (invalidating under Fourth and Fifth Amendments federal 
statute that conclusively presumed facts supporting forfeiture from failure of claimants to 
surrender business records bearing on the facts at issue). 
 33. 198 U.S. 45, 50 (1905) (invalidating state wage-and-hour legislation on substantive due 
process grounds). 
 34. 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) (emphasis added). 
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Before the Court begins to qualify incorporation so as to restore a dual 
system of criminal procedure, the justices are likely to demand a coherent due 
process theory that (a) fits the text and history tolerably well, (b) accords with 
widely shared value judgments about the criminal process and (c) supplies 
tolerably clear guidance for law enforcement officers and the lower courts.  
Professor Israel shows in great detail how the Court’s basic approach has 
evolved over time, reflecting a permanent albeit shifting dissatisfaction with 
the legitimacy, morality or determinacy of prior due process approaches.  What 
I would like to do in the remainder of this Comment is to suggest that we really 
have learned some important lessons from the criminal procedure revolution, 
and that what we have learned can help us to build a general due process 
theory that satisfies the criteria of legitimacy, morality and determinacy. 
What exactly have we learned?  First, we have learned that the Court has 
the capacity to formulate constitutional doctrine in categorical rules, 
sufficiently determinate to guide the police.  Illustrative here are the seemingly 
disparate Miranda rules announced by the Warren Court to govern custodial 
interrogation35 and the Fourth Amendment bright-line rules announced by the 
Burger Court to govern searches incident to arrest.36  In both cases, general 
constitutional text was given concrete meaning in a specific recurring factual 
context.  In both contexts, some residual uncertainty remains (What is custody? 
Does the search-incident power under New York v. Belton extend to 
passengers? etc.), but nonetheless both sets of rules provide functionally 
effective guidance to the police and the lower courts. 
Second, we have learned something about shared values in the criminal 
process.  Despite the shifts in judicial ideology, there is widespread agreement 
that the investigation should burden individuals only in proportion to the 
probability of a successful prosecution, and that the adjudication of charges 
should promote accurate fact-finding.  The development of the Fourth 
Amendment balancing test reflects the first area of broad agreement;37 cases as 
diverse as Brady,38 Strickland v. Washington,39 and Ake v. Oklahoma40 reflect 
the second. 
 
 35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  The Court recently reaffirmed Miranda, 
relying in part on the advantages of a relatively clear rule to govern the interrogation situation.  
See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000). 
 36. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 (1981) (incident to lawful arrest of occupant of 
automobile police may search passenger compartment and any containers therein); United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (incident to lawful arrest police may search the person of 
the arrested individual without case-by-case inquiry into presence of probable cause or ability to 
obtain warrant). 
 37. On the development of the balancing test, see, for example, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1 (3d ed. 1996). 
 38. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963) (holding that due process requires disclosure, 
on request, of exculpatory evidence).  The Court has not called Brady into question, although it 
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A substantive due process test that forbids deprivations of liberty out of 
rational proportion to the strength of the antecedent suspicion would 
incorporate the Fourth Amendment cases but extend their principle beyond the 
narrow orbit of searches and seizures.  Such a test would translate a widely 
accepted value judgment into constitutional doctrine, conforming as well as 
any other substantive due process approach with text and history.  The Lewis 
opinion’s shock-the-conscience test is utterly ahistorical; as a test of 
substantive due process rights it dates only to 1966.41  Prohibiting the 
executive from punishing without trial in the guise of investigation follows far 
more faithfully from text and history.  A procedural due process test based on 
the Mathews v. Eldridge42 inquiry into instrumental reliability would likewise 
translate shared values into constitutional doctrine. 
The standard counter to the Mathews analysis in criminal cases is that 
history informs constitutional analysis more fully in criminal than in 
 
has required a showing that a Brady violation prejudiced the defendant before requiring a new 
trial.  United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985). 
 39. 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (holding that showing of unprofessional error by defense 
counsel, coupled with prejudice to the defendant, requires new trial on grounds of ineffective 
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administrative cases.43  The standard counter is not particularly persuasive.  In 
1791, the Bill of Rights criminal procedure provisions would have followed 
from the Mathews factors.  Some of the Bill of Rights safeguards, such as 
grand jury presentment, no longer promote instrumental goals.  Other 
procedures, such as reliability-based regulation of police identification 
procedures, might now be required by the Mathews test.  The failure of the 
framers of the Bill of Rights to include such procedures ought not to immunize 
police investigation from constitutional scrutiny.  After all, the modern 
municipal police force was not invented for half a century following the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights.44  And whatever support the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment may give to the idea of including the Bill of Rights in 
the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the historical record does 
not support limiting the scope of Fourteenth Amendment due process to the 
provisions in the Bill of Rights.45 
Of course strong disagreement remains when the general principles of 
proportionality and reliability are applied to particular cases.  Whether close 
contact with a drug-sniffing dog imposes a major or minor invasion of liberty 
is open to reasonable dispute.  So is the constitutionally minimal support for 
indigent defense attorneys, investigators and experts.  Many bodies of 
constitutional doctrine, however, leave room for principled disagreement.  
They are thought successes so long as they properly frame the issues for 
decision.  The fundamental fairness doctrine failed that test.  The approaches I 
have suggested might very well pass. 
Putting the lessons of history together, the federal courts could develop 
bright-line due process rules to deal with issues not dealt with by the Bill of 
Rights.  Eyewitness testimony and informants are excellent examples, where 
the inapplicability of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments has left the 
police essentially unregulated, with baleful consequences.  Informants, for 
example, invade the liberty of association by gaining trust through treachery, 
defrauding the innocent into friendship.  Informants, moreover, pose a threat to 
the reliability of the trial, for their testimony is typically motivated by self-
 
 43. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.26 (1975).  Post-Gerstein cases have 
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interest, pecuniary or penal.  Requiring reasonable suspicion before insinuating 
a spy into the intimate circle of the target illustrates a substantive due process 
approach founded on the proportionality principle.  Excluding informant 
testimony uncorroborated by electronic recording, absent exigent 
circumstances, illustrates a procedural due process approach based on 
instrumental reliability. 
If experience with due process rules as a supplement to the incorporated 
amendments turned out well, confidence in due process might lead the judges 
to allow the states some freedom from the incorporated amendments.  In short, 
incorporation resulted from the absence of a viable alternative founded on due 
process, and will remain at least as long as no such alternative emerges.  If 
such an alternative does emerge, incorporation itself, which evolved more out 
of desperation than design, would be ripe for reconsideration. 
There is of course the claim that text and history affirmatively require 
incorporation.  That claim has attracted new support in the last twenty years,46 
support that deserves to be considered in full on some other occasion.  
Thoughtful students of the historical record, however, might well agree that 
whatever the best resolution of the textual and historical arguments might be, 
the record is mixed enough to permit the play of pragmatic considerations.  I 
hasten to add that if due process means fundamental fairness applied on a case-
by-case basis in light of the totality of the circumstances, pragmatic 
considerations very strongly support incorporation.  The burden quite properly 
lies on proponents of due process to articulate and defend a better theory than 
the one the Court rejected in the 1960s.  I know we ought to try, and I think we 
can succeed. 
 
 
 46. See, e.g., id. 
